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‘We ought to give those who are to leave life … the terminally ill … the 
same care and attention that we give those who enter life – the new-born.’1 
In this article it is contended that terminally ill inmates have a right to 
palliative care and that the State has a duty to fulfil this right. The number 
of unsuccessful medical parole applications and recorded natural deaths of 
inmates is considered as indicative of the problem of terminally ill inmates 
in South African prisons. It is further contended that the State’s obligation 
arises from an inmate’s constitutional right to health care and from an 
increasingly recognised international human right to palliative care.
1.  Background
In the 21st century we have begun to recognise that our physical and 
mental well-being is fundamental to a dignified life. The endorsement 
of the right to health thus finds widespread support as a failure to give 
effect to it impairs the right to dignity. In South Africa efforts to fulfil 
the constitutional right to access health care services include inter alia 
free health care services for pregnant women and children under the 
age of seven years and the provision of Nevirapine to HIV-positive 
mothers and their new-born babies to prevent HIV transmission to 
babies.2 However, the plight of inmates3 who are terminally ill and 
denied release on medical parole4 do not feature prominently on the 
State’s health care agenda. They, like other terminally ill persons, need 
palliative care (which will be defined below).
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1 D Doyle , G Hanks, N Cherny, K Calman Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine 3ed 
(2004) 1199.
2 D McQuoid-Mason & M Dada A –Z of Medical Law (2011) 6. See also Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
3 For the purpose of this paper ‘inmate’ refers to sentenced offenders in South African 
correctional centres. 
4 ‘Parole’ is ‘… a continuation of a sentence outside of the correctional facility.’ J Mujuzi 
‘Unpacking the law and practice relating to parole in South Africa’ (2011) 14 PER 205. 
‘Medical parole’ is, in short, granted to an inmate who is too ill to continue serving his 
or her sentence in the correctional facility. In other words, an inmate can be released 
on humanitarian grounds. 
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It is argued here that the State has an obligation to provide palliative 
care to terminally ill inmates. This will be highlighted in discussions 
of the complexities presented by medical parole and the number of 
deaths in correctional centres. It is also contended that the State’s 
obligation stems from an inmate’s constitutional right to health care 
services and that it is further bolstered by an international human right 
to palliative care. In conclusion Uganda’s approach to the provision of 
palliative care will be considered with a view to drawing on lessons 
for South Africa.
2.  Why terminally ill inmates?
State funded palliative treatment is not readily available. Terminally ill 
persons who are not imprisoned may, with assistance from their family 
and support networks, gain access to some State services. They may 
also depend on their support networks where the State’s assistance is 
lacking. The plight of inmates is worse. They cannot access services 
available to the public due to security measures in correctional centres, 
a lack of transport and staff capacity and the absence of family or 
other support networks. They are thus a marginalised group in the 
absence of state assistance.
3.  Medical parole
When an inmate is diagnosed with a terminal disease, we expect that 
he or she will be released on medical parole. Due to the law which 
deals with medical parole, this is not always the case. Section 79 of the 
Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 provides
‘Any person serving any sentence in prison, and who based on the written 
evidence of the medical practitioner treating that person, is diagnosed 
as being in the final phase of any terminal disease or condition may be 
considered for placement under correctional supervision or on parole … to 
die a consolatory and dignified death.’
In Du Plooy, the Court emphasised that ‘… the general rule [is that] 
an offender cannot expect to escape punishment … because of ill 
health.’5 Section 79 of the Correctional Services Act stipulates the 
circumstances under which inmates may be released on medical 
grounds. It has been amended, but the new provision is not yet in 
force (at the time of writing). The current law, section 79, will thus be 
discussed in addition to the new law.
5 Du Plooy v Minister of Correctional Services 2004 JOL 12850 (T) Case No. 6399/04 at 
para 4.
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Section 79 permits the release of an inmate to allow a dignified 
and consolatory death. Consequently, inmates’ state of health ‘must 
have deteriorated to such an extent that their death is imminent.’6 In 
Stanfield7 the Court held ‘[t]o insist that he remain incarcerated until 
he has become visibly debilitated and bedridden can by no stretch of 
the imagination be regarded as humane treatment in accordance with 
his inherent dignity.’8 The inmate suffered from incurable lung cancer 
and doctors certified that he had only months left to live, but he was 
denied medical parole by the Parole Board. The Court ordered the 
release of the inmate on medical grounds. In the subsequent case of 
Mazibuko v Minister of Correctional Services, the inmate was diagnosed 
with AIDS and his medical condition was deteriorating daily according 
to his doctors. The Regional Commissioner of Correctional Services, 
in Gauteng, however declined the inmate’s application for parole. He 
then applied to the High Court to have the decision set aside. The 
Court ordered his release and held that to deny him medical parole 
was ‘unjust, unlawful, unreasonable, and procedurally unfair.’9 In Du 
Plooy the inmate was also diagnosed with AIDS. The Court held that 
not granting him medical parole was a ‘violation of [his] right not be 
treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner, and his right to 
access medical care, that it was in violation to human dignity, and that 
it was also irrational and unreasonable.’10
The above cases demonstrate that section 79 has sometimes been 
applied by parole boards in a manner that infringed upon inmates’ 
right to dignity. There has also been controversy around the granting of 
parole in high profile cases. A case in point was the release on medical 
parole of Shabir Shaik, a businessman and former financial advisor of 
the South African president, Jacob Zuma. Mr Shaik had served less 
than three years of his fifteen-year sentence for fraud when he was 
released on medical grounds. The legitimacy of his release was the 
subject of debate in the media and has resulted in further controversy 
as he is still alive three years after his release.11 It triggered interest 
in the issue of medical parole. A new law will, however, come into 
force soon. It is contained in section 14 of the Correctional Matters 
6 J Mujuzi ‘Releasing terminally ill prisoners on medical parole in South Africa’ South 
African Journal of Bioethics and Law, December 2009, Vol. 2, No. 2 at 59.
7 Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 2003 (4) All SA 282 (C).
8 Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services supra (n 12) at para 124.
9 [2007] JOL 18957 (T) Case No. 3851/05, at 11.
10 Du Plooy supra (n5) at para 26.
11 See Mujuzi op cit (n6) 59. See also Mbonambi, G., and Khumalo, S. ‘Shaik accused 
of attacking reporter’, 28 February 2011, IOL News http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-
africa/kwazulu-natal/shaik-accused-of-attacking-reporter-1.1033213 [accessed on 1 
October 2011].
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Amendment Act 5 of 2011 and it substitutes section 79 in its entirety. 
Section 14 provides
‘(1) Any sentenced offender may be considered for placement on medical 
parole, … if–
(a) such offender is suffering from a terminal disease or condition or if 
such offender is rendered physically incapacitated as a result of injury, 
disease or illness so as to severely limit daily activity or inmate self-
care;
(b) the risk of re-offending is low; and
(c) there are appropriate arrangements for the inmate’s supervision, care and 
treatment within the community to which the inmate is to be released.
 (2) (a) An application for medical parole shall be lodged in the prescribed 
manner, by–
(i)  a medical practitioner; or
(ii)  a sentenced offender or a person acting on his or her behalf.
 (b) An application lodged, by a sentenced offender or a person acting 
on his or her behalf, in accordance with paragraph (a)(ii), shall not be 
considered … if such application is not supported by a written medical 
report recommending placement on medical parole.
 (c) The written medical report must include … .–
(i)  a complete medical diagnosis and prognosis of the terminal illness or 
physical incapacity from which the sentenced offender suffers;
(ii)  a statement by the medical practitioner indicating whether the offender 
is so physically incapacitated as to limit daily activity or inmate self-care; 
and
(iii)  reasons as to why the placement on medical parole should be 
considered.
 (3) (a) The Minister must establish a medical advisory board to provide 
an independent medical report to the National Commissioner, Correctional 
Supervision and Parole Board or the Minister, as the case may be. In addition 
to the medical report referred to in subsection (2)(c).
 (b) Nothing in this section prohibits a medical practitioner or medical 
advisory board from obtaining a written medical report from a specialist 
medical practitioner.
 (4) (a) The placement of a sentenced offender on medical parole must take 
place in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI12 and is subject to–
(i)  the provision of informed consent by such offender to allow the 
disclosure of his or her medical information, to the extent necessary, in 
order to process an application for medical parole; and
(ii)  the agreement by such offender to subject himself or herself to such 
monitoring conditions as set by the Correctional Supervision and 
Parole Board in terms of section 52,13 with an understanding that such 
12 Chapter VI deals with community corrections. These are sentences that are served 
outside of correctional facilities. 
13 Section 52 sets out conditions relating community corrections. An offender can be 
ordered to, for example, seek employment, compensate the victim or take part in a 
development or support programme. 
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conditions may be amended and or supplemented depending on the 
improved medical condition of such offender.
 (b) An offender placed on medical parole may be requested to undergo 
periodical medical examinations by a medical practitioner in the employ of 
the Department.
 (5) When making a determination as contemplated in subsection (1)(b) the 
following factors, amongst others, may be considered:
(a)  Whether, at the time of sentencing, the presiding officer was aware of 
the medical condition for which medical parole is sought in terms of 
this section;
(b)  any sentencing remarks of the trial judge or magistrate;
(c)  the type of offence and the length of the sentence outstanding;
(d)  the previous criminal record of such offender: or
(e)  any of the factors listed in section 42(2)(d).14
Section 14(2)(c)(ii) requires that an application for medical parole be 
supported by a written statement as to ‘whether the offender is so 
physically incapacitated as to limit daily activity or inmate self-care.’ 
The inmate must thus be helpless and dependent on others for care. 
This is similar to the ‘final phase of the terminal illness’ requirement in 
section 79.15 In this respect the new provision seems constitutionally 
suspect as a requirement that an inmate should be bedridden and 
14 Section 42(2)(d) provides that a report must be submitted to the Correctional 
Supervision and Parole Board regarding –
(i)  the offence or offences for which the sentenced offender is serving a term of 
incarceration together with the judgment on the merits and any remarks made by 
the court in question at the time of the imposition of sentence if made available 
to the Department;
(ii) the previous criminal record of such offender;
(iii)  the conduct, disciplinary record, adaptation, training, aptitude, industry, physical 
and mental state of such offender;
(iv)  the likelihood of a relapse into crime, the risk posed to the community and the 
manner in which this risk can be reduced;
(v)  [a sentenced offender who has been declared a habitual criminal which indicates 
that–
(aa)  there is a reasonable probability that such an offender will in future abstain 
from crime and lead a useful and industrious life; or
(bb)  such an offender is no longer capable of engaging in crime; or
(cc)  for any other reason, it is desirable to place such an offender on parole 
the assessment results and the progress with regard to the correctional 
sentence plan contemplated in section 38;
(vi)  the possible [re-placement] placement of [such] an offender under correctional 
supervision in terms of a sentence provided for in section 276(1)(i) or 287(4)(a) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act, or in terms of the conversion of such an offender’s 
sentence into correctional supervision under section 276A(3)(e)(ii), 286B(4)(h)
(ii)] or 287(4)(h) of the said Act, and the conditions for such placement:
(vii) the possible placement of such sentenced offender on day parole [or on] parole 
or medical parole, and the conditions for such placement.
15 Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services supra (n7) at para 124.
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visibly suffering in order to be released on medical parole infringes on 
his/her right to dignity.
In terms of section 14(1)(b) an inmate must pose a ‘low risk of 
reoffending’. Section 14(4)(a) to (e) of the Act (see above) lists the factors 
to be considered in determining the risk. It is not evident how these 
factors can reasonably be regarded as indicators of an inmate’s risk of 
re-offending. Past remarks by a sentencing judge and the nature of the 
offence the inmate had been convicted for, says nothing reasonably 
conclusive about future criminality. In Stanfield,16 Van Zyl J held that 
‘… it is irrelevant what the nature of [the offender’s] conviction and 
the length of his sentence of imprisonment might be’ when deciding 
whether or not a terminally ill inmate should be released.
Section 14 requires that appropriate arrangements be made for the 
inmate’s care after release. The Act does not stipulate who is responsible 
for making these arrangements and what constitute ‘adequate 
arrangements’. It also does not offer guidance as to what ought to happen 
if an inmate does not have a support structure in his or her community. 
This is despite the fact that the Department of Correctional Services has 
indicated to Parliament that there is a lack of ‘after care by offenders’ 
families, community structures and hospices [and] … [where] families 
were unable to take the inmate … into their care, the Department of 
Correctional Services simply took them back.’17 The Legislature should 
have made it explicit that as custodian of inmates, the Department of 
Correctional Services will have to take steps to ensure the proper care 
of such inmates even outside prison walls.
In summary there are at least two categories of terminally ill 
inmates who require care. The first includes those who are not eligible 
for medical parole as they do not meet all the requirements of the 
medical parole provisions. The second category is those who have no 
support outside of the correctional environment and for whom the 
Department of Correctional Services cannot find alternative care in a 
hospice institutions for example.
4.  Deaths in correctional centres
The Department of Correctional Services does not make available 
significant detail about the causes of death of inmates. The Judicial 
Inspectorate for Correctional Services’ reports are therefore invaluable 
in gauging the extent to which inmates are affected by terminal illness. 
Below some of the most recent reports are discussed.
16 Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services supra (n7) at para 82.
17 HIV Prevalence Survey, terminally ill inmates and medical parole issues, 1 August 
2008 http://www.openthesis.org/search/lastSearch.html [Accessed 7 August 2011].
72 SACJ . (2012) 1
SACJ-2012-1-Text.indd   72 6/12/12   1:59:08 PM
The report for the period 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008 indicated 
that 1136 inmates had died during 2007 and that 1056 of these fatalities 
were occasioned by natural causes.18 The annual report for the period 
1 April 2008 to 31 March 2009 showed that the Judicial Inspectorate 
for Correctional Centres had received 1048 death reports of which 
982 were classified as natural deaths.19 The Judicial Inspectorate 
for Correctional Services considers the classification of deaths as 
‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’. ‘Natural’ fatalities are dealt with internally 
by the Department of Correctional Services and are not subjected to 
an independent inquest in terms of section 2 of the Inquest Act 58 
of 1959. Heads of Correctional Centres regard all deaths by natural 
causes such as heart attacks, strokes, cancer, tuberculosis and the like 
as ‘natural’. No independent inquests are thus done in respect of such 
deaths.20 This is problematic because a deceased who had suffered 
from a chronic condition, for example could have died as a direct 
result of an ‘action’ or ‘inaction’ by the Department of Correctional 
Services.21 In early 2009 the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional 
Services received a sample of 269 death reports. It appeared that 230 
(86%) of the inmates had received medical treatment prior to their 
death. Medical parole was considered in 36 (14%) of these cases, but 
none of them had been successful. The Judicial Inspectorate concluded 
that this may be an indication that medical parole is not considered in 
the majority of cases in practice.22
The report for the period 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 indicates 
that medical officers do not substantively complete reporting forms in 
which the cause of death and underlying or contributory factors or pre-
existing illnesses suffered by a detainee are recorded.23 Many death 
certificates and supporting documentation related to natural deaths in 
2009 did not reach the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 
before its annual report was made available, it was thus impossible 
to assess the circumstances under which the 992 reported deaths 
had occurred.24 The 22,053 complaints about health care and 748 
about medical parole received in 2009 must be considered to allude to 
unsatisfactory circumstances in the correctional centres.25
18 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons Annual Report for the period 1 April 2007 to 31 
March 2008 at 26.
19 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons Annual Report for the period 1 April 2008 to 31 
March 2009 at 12.
20 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons supra (n19) at 24.
21 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons supra (n19) at 24.
22 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons supra (n19) at 25. 
23 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons Annual Report for the period 1 April 2007 to 31 
March 2008 at 27. 
24 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons supra (n23) at 31.
25 Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons supra (n23) at 37. 
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In summation, between 1 April 2007 and 31 March 2010 nearly 
3000 inmates have died due to ‘natural causes’. Though the number of 
fatalities during the three year period is arguably not high in proportion 
to the general inmate population, it is indicative that a problem exists 
and that the State should address the issue of terminally ill inmates.
5.  The definition of palliative care
Before one may argue in favour of the right, it is necessary to 
understand the meaning of palliative care. Palliative care includes: 
physical; psychosocial; and spiritual care.26 ‘[T]he essence of palliative 
care is the relief of pain.’27 Palliative care aims to: (a) recognise the 
importance of life, but regards dying as a normal process; (b) provide 
relief from pain and other distressing symptoms; (c) integrate the 
psychological and spiritual aspects of patient care; (d) help patients 
live as actively as possible until death; and (e) assist the family to cope 
during the patient’s illness and their subsequent bereavement when 
the patient dies;28 (f) neither hasten or postpone death; (g) use a team 
approach to address the needs of patients and their families.29 The 
World Health Organisation adds that palliative care is applicable early 
in the course of the illness.30
6.  The state’s obligation to provide palliative care to 
terminally ill inmates
The need for palliative care may be more evident than the right to 
palliative care. There is presently no specific law or national policy 
regulating palliative care.31 The State’s duty to provide palliative care 
to citizens can however be inferred from the right to health. This 
proposition will be discussed later. First, however, it will be explained 
why inmates enjoy the same rights as other citizens.
6.1  A constitutionally entrenched residuum of basic rights
The purpose of imprisonment is not to punish inmates.
‘[A] … prisoner retains all the basic rights and liberties … of an ordinary 
citizen except those taken away from him by law … or those necessarily 
inconsistent with the circumstances in which he, as a prisoner, is placed … 
26 L Gwyther and J Cohen Legal Aspects of Palliative Care (2009) 2.
27 Gwyther and Cohen op cit (n26) 2.
28 McQuoid-Mason and Dada op cit (n2) at 312. 
29 Gwyther and Cohen op cit (n26) 2.
30 Gwyther and Cohen op cit (n26) 2.
31 McQuoid-Mason and Dada op cit (n2) at 312.
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[T]here is a substantial residuum of basic rights which he cannot be denied 
… .’32
The common law residuum principle was upheld in Goldberg. In 
August33 where the Constitutional Court upheld inmates’ right to vote 
in the elections, it confirmed that the principle had been ‘reinforced 
and entrenched’ by the Constitution.34 Maseko and Singh correctly 
contend that ‘[p]risoners … enjoy those rights that are specifically 
provided to them by the Constitution [and] also that … enjoyed by 
ordinary people.’35 The claim for palliative care may thus be premised 
on the constitutional right to health care services guaranteed in sections 
27 and 35(2)(e), which are discussed next.
6.2  Section 27(1)(a): Everyone’s right to have access health 
care services
Section 27(1)(a) requires that reasonable legislative and other measures 
be employed within the available State resources to ensure that the 
right is progressively realised. Section 27 was considered by the Court 
in Soobramoney where the applicant had sought expensive renal 
dialysis treatment from a State hospital to prolong his life. He was 
denied access because the hospital policy provided that the treatment 
was aimed at patients whose condition could be remedied.36 The 
Court held that ‘if everyone in the same position as the appellant 
was to be admitted, the [State’s] carefully tailored programme would 
collapse and no one would benefit from that.’37 There will be times 
when the State cannot focus on the specific needs of an individual and 
must adopt a holistic approach to the needs of the populace.38 The 
appellant’s claim was dismissed.
The claim for palliative care is distinguishable from that in 
Soobramoney. A claim for palliative care does not necessarily involve 
expensive treatment. The financial burden on the State will not be 
extended beyond the ‘natural span’ of a terminally ill person’s life. 
Palliative care is aimed at upholding the dignity of a dying person. The 
contention here is not that state-of-the-art treatment should be provided 
instantly, but that there should be a plan to address basic needs of 
32 Goldberg v Minister of Prisons 1979 (1) SA 14 (A) at 39D-F. 
33 August v Electoral Commissions 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
34 August supra (n33) at paras 18-19.
35 A Singh and TW Maseko ‘The protection of prisoners’ rights to health care services 
in the South African law: Is it adequate?’ (2006) 31 Journal for Juridical Science 80 at 
81. 
36 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at para 1.
37 Soobramoney supra (n36) para 26.
38 Soobramoney supra (n36) para 31.
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terminally ill persons and which sets out how comprehensive care will 
be afforded in the long-term.
6.3  Section 35(2)(e): Right to appropriate conditions of 
detention
‘Every sentenced person has a right to conditions of detention that are 
consistent with human dignity, including at least … the provision at State 
expense of adequate … medical treatment.’
Section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution is not subject to resource limitation. 
A ‘strong constitutional protection afforded to the socio-economic rights 
of [inmates] is appropriate given [that] inmates are totally dependent 
on the state for all their basic needs’.39 A claim for palliative care 
may thus be premised on section 35(2)(e). It will be seen below that 
there is ‘some discord’ between the High Court’s interpretation of the 
provision in Van Biljon and how scholars have construed it. 40
In Van Biljon41 the Court ordered that HIV-positive inmates should 
be provided access to antiretroviral treatment. It held that ‘once it 
is established that anything less than a particular form of medical 
treatment would not be adequate, the prisoner has a constitutional 
right to that treatment.’42 The Court read resource qualification43 into 
the ambit of the right by adding that adequate medical treatment must 
be considered within the scope of what the State can afford.
Maseko and Singh contend that the standard of adequacy in section 
35(2)(e) should not have been made subject to the availability of 
resources.44 The ‘accepted basic standards of medical treatment for 
prisoners in international and comparative law’45 should have been 
considered. Furthermore, the Court should have considered the 
fundamental rule that inmates must be treated with humanity and 
that their dignity must be respected. They emphasise the African 
Commission’s decision in Mukong v Cameroon46 where it was held that 
the fulfilment of prisoners’ right to health care, as a requirement in 
terms of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 
39 See S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 257.
40 M Pieterse ‘The potential of socio-economic rights litigation for the achievement of 
social justice: Considering the example of access to medical care in South African 
prisons’ (2006) 50 Journal of African Law 118 at 125.
41 Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (6) BCLR 789 (C). 
42 Van Biljon supra (n41) at para 49.
43 J Barnes ‘Not too ‘great expectations’: Considering the right to health care in prisons 
and its constitutional implementation’ (2009) SACJ 39 at 44.
44 Singh and Maseko op cit (n35) 90.
45 Singh and Maseko op cit (n35) 90.
46 No.458/1991 (August 10, 1994) U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991.
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does not depend on the availability of resources. It means that the 
availability or lack of resources should determine the nature of the 
actions to be taken by a State. If the fulfilment of a right thus requires 
substantial resources which the State does not have at its disposal, the 
State must still take steps in pursuance of the right. The initial steps 
may involve actions which require limited resources.
With regards to unqualified rights like section 35(2)(e), resource 
limitations should not be applied to the ambit of the entitlement, but 
rather to the enforcement of the right.47 A limitation will then have 
to be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.48 Given the 
strict criteria of section 36 it ought not to be easy for the State to justify 
a refusal to provide palliative care.
Liebenberg states that the words ‘at least’ in section 35(2)(e) denote 
the minimum goods and services which inmates should be afforded.49 
Inmates may claim ‘whatever [is] necessary to ensure conditions of 
detention consistent with human dignity’. This interpretation has 
been borne out by a number of cases subsequent to Van Biljon. 
In Strydom50 the Court held that the prison authority’s decision to 
remove access to electrical sockets in the prison cells was a violation 
of the inmates’ human dignity.51 The Court ordered that inmates 
be given access to electricity in their cells. In N,52 fifteen HIV/AIDS 
positive inmates sought an order compelling the State to inter alia 
give them access to anti-retroviral treatment in accordance with the 
government Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
Care (Operation Plan). The Court held that it was ‘regrettable that 
prisoners, being a class, very vulnerable to infection, were not given 
special consideration in the Operational Plan … .’53 It was ordered 
that inmates be granted access to the programme. A reasonable State 
programme must therefore debatably include vulnerable groups like 
inmates. In Ehrlich v Minister of Correctional Services, the Court held 
that the prison authority’s decision to prohibit the applicant’s access 
to the prison gymnasium where their karate development programme 
had been running for the previous two years violated the inmates’ 
47 Pieterse op cit (n40) 125. See also Liebenberg op cit (n39) 258.
48 Pieterse op cit (n40) 126.
49 See Liebenberg op cit (n39) 257. Huang v Head of Grootvlei Prison Case No 992/2003 
(ZAFSHC) (unreported judgment of 15 May 2003) at para 30.
50 Strydom v Minister of Correctional Services 1999 (3) BCLR 342 (W). 
51 Strydom supra (n50) at para 15.
52 EN and Others v Government of the RSA and Others [2007] 1 All SA 74 (D).
53 N supra (n52) at para 29.
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right to dignity.54 The Court ordered that access to the gymnasium be 
allowed.
These cases demonstrate that the State’s obligation may involve 
enabling access to the resources in the correctional centres as well 
resources provided to the public. The State may follow this approach 
in giving effect to terminally ill inmates’ rights.
6.4  An emerging international human right to palliative care
There is a growing recognition of an international human right to 
palliative care.55 International law does not expressly provide for a 
right, yet advocates for palliative care contend that it can be successfully 
argued for. Various international law instruments will be discussed 
below.
The World Health Organisation’s definition of ‘health’ and ‘palliative 
care’ gives rise to a reasonable inference that health applies to all 
including people with life-limiting illnesses.56 Palliative care forms 
part of a continuum of health care for all persons. According to 
Brennan, a right to palliative care may thus be implied from the overall 
international human right to health.57 Given that it includes more than 
‘medical care’ the right to palliative care is also indirectly supported by 
other rights such as the right to food, accommodation, social security 
and importantly, the right to dignity.
6.4.1  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights58 prohibits ‘cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment’.59 A failure to afford necessary palliative care 
to inmates, especially treatment aimed at alleviating pain, may be 
challenged as a violation of the right. Furthermore, the Declaration 
states that ‘[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health of himself and his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services.’60 Arguably 
this formulation promotes the holistic approach which palliative care 
affords patients.
54 Ehrlich v Minister of Correctional Services and Another 2009 (2) SA 373 (E) at 
para 43.
55 See the Cape Town Declaration (2002), the Korea Declaration (2007) and the Budapest 
Commitment (2007).
56 F Brennan ‘Palliative care as an international human right’ (2007) 33 Journal of Pain 
and Symptom Management 494 at 495.
57 Brennan op cit (n56) 495.
58 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 A (III) (10 December 1948).
59 Article 5.
60 Article 25.1.
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6.4.2  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966)
The Human Rights Committee on Civil and Political Rights has held 
that the conditions of detention and treatment of inmates may, in 
certain circumstances violate article 7 which prohibits cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment.61 States parties are under an obligation, 
‘regardless of their development’, to comply with certain minimum 
standards regarding the conditions of detention. These include inter 
alia adequate sanitary facilities, clothing, food of nutritional value, 
adequate for health and strength.62 The minimum standards must be 
complied with even under conditions of budgetary constraints.63 The 
Covenant in article 10 places a positive duty on the States parties to 
ensure that inmates are treated with respect and human dignity.
6.4.3  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,64 
signed by South Africa, provides that ‘[t]he State Parties … recognise 
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.’65 The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee has interpreted 
the right to health as
‘an inclusive right extending … to timely and appropriate health care, but 
also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and 
potable water and adequate sanitation, and adequate supply of safe food, 
nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions 
and access to health-related education and information … .’66
The Covenant recognises that rights may not be immediately attainable 
due to resource-constraints. State parties are thus committed to 
progressive realisation of the right to health. The Committee recognises 
that the right is dependent upon a number of social, economic and 
cultural rights and while this raises challenges of how to prioritise 
61 Liebenberg op cit (n39) 259.
62 Allen Womah v Cameroon, Comm No 458/1991, Report on Human Rights Committee, 
Vol II, General Assembly Official Records, 49th Sess Suppl No 40 (A/49/40) 
para 9.4.
63 Allen Womah supra (n62) para 9.4.
64 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966). 
65 Article 12.1.
66 The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 14, UN Doc E/C/12/2000/4 
para 38.
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an entire population’s socio-economic needs, it must be accepted that 
rights are interdependent.67
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Committee has confirmed that access to essential drugs, as defined by 
the World Health Organisation Action Programme on Drugs, is part 
of the minimum core content of the right to health. At least fourteen 
palliative care medications are on the World Health Organisation 
Essential Drug List.68 The Committee has observed that a State party 
‘… cannot … justify its non-compliance with the core obligations … 
which are non-derogable’.69 In General Comment No 14 issued by 
the Committee it is asserted that State parties must respect the right 
to health by refraining from denying or limiting equal access for all 
persons, including prisoners to preventative, curative and palliative 
health services. It is significant that palliative care is recognised as a 
health service alongside curative and preventative care. It denotes that 
these health services are all of equal importance.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment reported that 
the de facto denial of access to pain relief, ‘if it causes severe pain 
and suffering, constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.’70 He recommended that ‘all measures should be taken 
to ensure full access and to overcome regulatory, educational and 
attitudinal obstacles to ensure full access to palliative care.’71
6.4.4 International instruments pertaining to inmates
A detailed discussion regarding international instruments that apply 
to inmates’ health rights in South Africa is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Instruments providing for inmates’ right to health care services 
include: The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(1955); The Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1990); 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form 
of Detention or Imprisonment (1988) and the United Nations Rules 
for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990). The 
67 In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 
at para 23 the Court held that all rights in the Bill of Rights are inter-related and 
mutually supportive. 
68 Gwyther and Cohen op cit (n26) 9.
69 D Lohman, R Schleifer, J Amon ‘Access to pain treatment as a human right’ (2010) 8 
BCM Medicine 1 at 6. 
70 M Nowak ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, Promotion and Protection of all Human 
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the right to 
development’ A/HRC/10/44, 14 January 2009 at para 72.
71 Nowak op cit (n70) at para 74.
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African Commission Robben Island Guidelines72 are also important 
as they prohibit torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
These provide that States must ensure that detainees are treated in 
conformity with the international standards guided by the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.73 The 
latter instrument contains standards for the nature of medical services 
to be provided to prisoners, as well as the conditions of their detention, 
including facilities, food, sanitation and exercise. It also provides that 
inmates who require specialised treatment should be transferred to 
facilities where their needs can be met.74 This strengthens the claim of 
terminally ill inmates.
The notion of palliative care as an international human right enjoys 
increasing support, yet at least one alternative to framing the right 
in this way has been proposed. Kirk argues that the claim is not 
sufficiently developed philosophically.75 He suggests that the right to 
palliative care can be reasonably grounded in the ‘sanctity of individual 
liberty’.76 ‘Pain … [is] an incursion on liberty … .’77 He argues that 
States must introduce national palliative care strategies that maximise 
opportunities for effective care that minimises pain and provides 
individual liberty. Additionally, Kirk argues that human rights are 
perceived as individually held rights, while palliative care is aimed at 
palliating the suffering of terminally ill patients and their relatives. He 
advises that palliative care ought to be framed as a collective right.78
Kirk’s argument can give impetus to the promotion of palliative care 
services. It must be contended, however, that to frame palliative care 
as a human right is not ineffective as he suggests. Though couched as 
an individual human right in many international instruments, the right 
to health when given effect to has a positive impact on the well-being 
of both the individual and his/her intimates. Arguably, care provided 
to the patient not only consoles those close to him/her, but it also 
affirms to them that their rights will be given effect to. Colombo and 
Ziegler appropriately state ‘… what most of us fear the most of death, 
is not so much the fact that we will not be around anymore, but rather 
the possibility of becoming, before dying, an intolerable burden, for 
72 Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa.
73 Article 3.
74 See rules 22-23 of the instrument. See also Liebenberg op cit (n 37) 258.
75 T Kirk ‘The meaning, limitations and possibilities of making palliative care a public 
health priority by declaring it a human right (2011) 4 Public Health Ethics 84. 
76 Kirk op cit (n75) 87. 
77 Kirk op cit (n75) 87.
78 Kirk op cit (n75) 89.
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ourselves and for others.’79 The human rights approach to palliative 
care speaks to the concerns of the individual and the collective.
It is contended that there is an unspoken acceptance that satisfying 
the individual rights of a terminally ill patient eases the suffering of 
those around the patient. There is thus a collective benefit flowing from 
the fulfilment of an individual human right. Moreover it strengthens 
the claims of others in similar positions.
7.  Uganda
In 1998 the Ugandan government and the World Health Organisation 
agreed that national palliative care policies must be developed, that 
training in palliative care and access to drugs will be increased.80 
Subsequently, Uganda became the first nation in Africa to declare 
palliative care an essential clinical service for all citizens.81 Uganda’s 
efforts should be a motivation to South Africa. The Ugandan 
Constitution does not contain a substantive right to health care, but 
under its national objectives of national policies it requires that the 
State ‘take all practical measures to ensure the provision of basic 
medical services to the population’.82 Mubangizi and Twinomugisha 
explain that Uganda is State party to many international and regional 
human rights instruments that spell out the right to health care and 
further that the Ugandan Constitution provides that the rights and 
freedoms specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights do not exclude 
other rights not mentioned.83 The right to health must thus be given 
effect to. To this end the introduction of policies set the ‘level of health 
care guaranteed’. Though Uganda still has much to do to meet the full 
extent of its obligation, the country is moving in the right direction.84
8.  Conclusion
The time is ripe to recognise that not all terminally ill inmates are 
released from correctional centres. In the past some inmates have 
79 S Colombo and R Ziegler ‘End-of-life and the good society: Affirming a legal right to 
palliative care – A model for Israel’ (2001) 2 European Journal of Comparative Law 
287 at 295–296 .
80 Lohman et al op cit (n69) at 7. 
81 Lohman et al op cit (n69) at 7. 
82 J Mubangizi and B Twinomugisha ‘The right to health in the specific context of access 
to HIV/AIDS medicines: What can South Africa and Uganda learn from each other?’ 
(2010) 10 African Human Rights Law Journal at 105.
83 Mubangizi and Twinomugisha op cit (n82) at 122.
84 T Bwambale, V Nabaranzi ‘Only 10 % Ugandans have access to palliative care’ New 
Vision 2 September 2011, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/16/764124 
[accessed on 3 September 2007]. 
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been denied release on medical parole even in instances where they 
had been diagnosed with a terminal illness. The case law as well as 
the statistics on medical parole and natural deaths of inmates provided 
by the Judicial Inspectorate attests to this reality. Additionally, the 
Department of Correctional Services has confirmed that it has in its 
custody terminally inmates who do not have any support networks 
outside of prison and who can thus not be released. The problem 
of terminally ill inmates who require palliative care thus beckons an 
urgent need for State action. Moreover the State must recognise that it 
has a legal obligation to provide terminally ill inmates with palliative 
care. The State’s duty arises from inmates’ constitutional right to 
health care services in terms of both section 27 and section 35(2)
(e). Section 35(2)(e) in particular affords inmates the right to claim 
medical treatment and other services that will at least give effect to 
their human dignity. A successful claim for palliative care on this basis 
is highly possible. It is also bolstered by the growing recognition of an 
international human right to palliative care which applies to everyone 
including inmates.
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